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EDITORIAL COMMENTS
EU law between common values and collective feelings
Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into
the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in
Kadi, inOpinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention
on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea.1 These
decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of
relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of
cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive
political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what
was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this
particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in
Member States’ societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question
of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and
collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our
current Union and its law.
Joseph Weiler’s The Tranformation of Europe published in 1991 already
provided an account of the foundational period of the European construct in
terms of an oscillation.3 It portrayed integration as an equilibrium between law
and politics. The legal structure fashioned by the ECJ in a series of landmark
decisions, amounting to the emergence of a federal type of legal order,
diminished the possibility for Member States to avoid their obligations under
the Treaty. This process favoured, and at the same time was enabled by, the
possibility for Member States to take control of the processes of
decision-making at the European level. In Weiler’s lexicon, borrowed from
Hirschman, since “exit” was foreclosed for Member States, the “voice” of
national governments increased, and this is what made the idea of a structured
legal framework, involving rigid procedures and far-reaching obligations,
acceptable for Member States. Clearly, many changes in the dynamics of
1. Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v.Council of the EU and Commission, EU:C:2008:461; Opinion 2/13, Accession of
the European Union to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454; Case C-284/16, Slovakian Republic v.
Achmea, EU:C:2018:158.
2. Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358; Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597.
3. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), 2403–2483.
Common Market Law Review 55: 1329–1340, 2018.
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European integration have occurred since then.4 It is not just that the
institutional practice has deviated from the “intergovernmental” control of the
law-making process as a consequence of the increasing powers of the EU
institutions and the introduction of majoritarian decision-making. It is not
simply that the legitimacy crisis that Weiler anticipated has widened and
deepened. It is much more fundamental than that: while the extent of
economic, social and cultural interdependence between the Member States is
the broadest and highest ever seen in European history, the sense of belonging
to a common project has never been so weak among national polities and
societies in the last sixty years.5 On the one hand, this state of interdependence
renders “total exit” – a Member State’s withdrawal from European Union –
very difficult, if not almost impossible, as evidenced by the laborious
negotiations over Brexit. On the other hand, the loss of a sense of belonging
has brought about growing political heterogeneity, increased social
contestation, but also a generalized slackening, a sense of lost community
within the Union.
In this context, the two terms of the foundational equilibrium as depicted by
Weiler are both thoroughly open to question. On the one hand, law as an
instrument of integration is perceived as meaningless. It amounts to a set of
extended obligations to which all Member States are uniformly bound, but the
meaning of this bond is unstated. The condition of legal integration seems to
be “without a final destination.”6 On the other hand, politics as complex
processes for making partial compromises is distrusted. It looks like a distant
machinery placed above the fray of political and social conflicts, removed
from ideological differences and value choices that matter for “real” people.
This has brought about two sorts of reaction. First, the legitimacy of Union
action has been enhanced through the introduction of a reference to values.7
Second, different mechanisms of participation and consultation of citizens
have been promoted as a way to bring European affairs down to the everyday
concerns of ordinary people. As a result, in most cases, Union action is based
on a rhetorical mix of references to values and social concerns. This mix is
4. See further Poiares Maduro and Wind (Eds.), The Transformation of Europe:
Twenty-Five Years On (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
5. These points are obviously difficult to measure. On the latter, the last Eurobarometer
survey of Spring 2018 indicates that overall 48% of Europeans trust the EU and 40% have a
positive image of the EU. On the other hand, a survey by Reuters of national opinion polls
conducted in July 2018 suggests that Eurosceptic parties could expand their strength in the
European Parliament by over 60% at elections next May.
6. Augenstein and Hendry, “The ‘Fertile dilemma of law’: Legal integration and legal
cultures in the European Union”, Tilburg Institute of Comparative and Transnational Law
Working Paper No. 2009/06.
7. See recently Foret and Calligaro,European Values. Challenges andOpportunities for EU
Governance (Routledge, 2018).
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reflected to some extent in the current evolution of EU law. An alternation is
evident in the ECJ’s case law, between exhibition of self-standing principles
and attention to the changing economic, political and societal environment.
The autonomy of EU law as justice
Perhaps the most obvious case of apparent “indifference” towards the current
environment in the recent case law is Achmea,8 which concerned the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in the Bilateral Investment
Treaty concluded between the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic. This
Treaty contained a clause entitling an investor to bring proceedings against
one of those two Member States before an arbitral tribunal chosen by the
parties. The ECJ reasoned that this tribunal may be called upon to interpret or
to apply EU law, “particularly the provisions concerning the fundamental
freedoms, including freedom of establishment and free movement of capital,”
and yet it is not part of any domestic judicial system. In the absence of any
clear connection to the EU system of judicial remedies, the Court ruled that
such a mechanism is liable to undermine the full effectiveness of EU law.
Especially striking is the Court’s apparent indifference towards the reasons for
the use of arbitration in the European and global investment context, as well as
towards the impact of its ruling on “economic reality”.9 Its only concern is the
protection of the autonomy of EU law.
The notion of autonomy used in this ruling is a juxtaposition of two
homonymous references. First, it refers to autonomy as classically defined in
the external relations field. In this field, the main issue is to preserve the
Union’s “independence of action”. Union action may be affected by the
external context and political realities. But what is decisive is that this “does
not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on the Union
institutions.”10 Autonomy amounts to a vision of the Union as an international
actor enjoying its own capacity to act. This focus on power can clearly be read
in the sequence of the formula that says: “an international agreement cannot
affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the
8. Case C-284/16, Achmea, EU:C:2018:158.
9. A reference to “economic reality” is to be found in Opinion of A.G Wathelet in Case
C-284/16, Achmea, EU:C:2017:699, para 36.
10. See Opinion 1/76, Draft agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland
waterway wessels, EU:C:1977:63, para 12 and Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement between the
European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common
Aviation Area, EU:C:2002:231, para 20.
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autonomy of the EU legal system.”11 Autonomy as originally developed in the
internal sphere is different: it refers to the classic notion that EU law is an
“independent source of law.”12 This means that the EU is a legal order distinct
from international law and the laws of the Member States, endowed with its
own basis of validity, capable of developing its own concepts and
interpretations, and calling for specific modes of enforcement. Such are “the
essential characteristics of the EU and its law.”13 In Achmea, the Court makes
the link between the notion of Union power prevalent in the external sphere
and the notion of the Union’s legal order applied in the internal realm.14
This is because a special institutional arrangement is concerned. The
requirement that “the essential character of the powers conferred on the Union
institutions” may not be altered and the requirement that “the essential
characteristics of the EU and its law” may not be adversely affected meet
when it comes to protecting the special “communicating link” that exists
between the ECJ and Member States’ courts. This link consists in a sharing of
powers whereby national courts are empowered to act as “European judges”
for the safeguarding of the unity and effectiveness of EU law, under the
authority of the Court.15 This gives rise to what was coined “a European
judicial power.”16 But why is it so essential to protect this power? What does
effectiveness of EU law refer to beyond its purely instrumental meaning? Two
sorts of answers are enshrined in this decision.
The first and most conspicuous answer relates to the objective of protecting
the unity and the integrity of the Internal Market. By creating an alternative to
the system of ordinary courts of the Member States in the field of investment
protection, the arbitration mechanism in question in this case might interfere
with the regimes of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital as
established in the case law of the ECJ. However, behind this looms another
11. Case C-284/16, Achmea, para 32, quoting Opinion 2/13, para 201. See already Opinion
1/91, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the
European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European
Economic Area, EU:C:1991:490, para 35. See further Contartese, “The autonomy of the EU
legal order in the ECJ’s external relations case law: From the ‘essential’ to the ‘specific
characteristics’ of the Union and back again”, 54 CML Rev. (2017), 1627–1671.
12. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, EU:C:1964:66. See further Barents, The Autonomy of
Community Law (Kluwer Law International, 2004).
13. Case C-284/16, Achmea, para 33.
14. Interestingly, this link also emerges in the guidelines adopted by the European Council
in the context of Brexit. In this context, the autonomy of the EU is concerned “as regards its
decision-making”. See e.g. European Council, Special meeting (Art. 50), 29 April 2017,
EUCO XT 20004/17.
15. Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system, EU:C:2011:123,
paras. 82–85.
16. Pescatore, The Law of Integration. Emergence of a new phenomenon in international
relations, based on the experience of the European Communities (Sijthoff, 1974), p. 100.
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concern: that of protecting a core Union value. It is settled case law that the
Court does not oppose arbitration proceedings as such. Although commercial
arbitration may be a way of avoiding the national system of courts, hence of
impairing the free movement regimes, it could be justified by the requirements
of efficient arbitration proceedings.17 Why, then, does investment protection
arbitration deserve special attention? The Court offers a remarkable
explanation: whereas commercial arbitration is based on the freely expressed
wishes of the parties, investment protection arbitration is based on two
Member States agreeing “to remove from the jurisdiction of their own
courts … disputes which may concern the application or interpretation of EU
law.”18 Thus, the issue is not just about establishing a system of judicial
remedies in the fields covered by EU law; it is about ensuring the integrity of
the existing national system of courts and tribunals. Public administration of
justice is an “essential State function” guaranteed by Union law.
Justice as a value
The value of justice had been upheld in the Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses ruling issued a few days prior to Achmea.19 In this case, the
effectiveness of EU law was not at issue; it was really about the protection of
“the set of shared values upon which the Union is founded.”20 The Court
establishes a self-standing obligation for Member States to maintain the
independence of their national courts in the fields covered by EU law on the
basis of Article 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU linked with Article 2 TEU.
The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU reads: “Member States
shall provide remedies to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered
by Union law.” This provision might originally look minimalist and oriented
solely towards the functional aim of ensuring the full effect of EU law in the
territories of the Member States. It does not even mention national courts. 21 It
then developed in the interpretation of the Court as a powerful reference,
acknowledging the role of the national court, in collaboration with the Court
of Justice, to ensure not only the full application of EU law but also the
17. The Court cites Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, EU:C:1999:269, paras. 35, 36 and 40, and
Case C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, EU:C:2006:675, paras. 34 to 39.
18. Case C-284/16, Achmea, para 55.
19. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
20. Ibid., para 30, quoting Opinion 2/13, para 168.
21. Ziller, “The Value of Justice in the European Constitution”, EUI Working Paper No.
2006/68, 11.
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effective judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law.22 This
is where Article 19(1) TEU is read in combination with Article 47 of the
Charter.23 Now, by combiningArticle 19(1) TEU andArticle 2 TEU, the Court
goes one step further: it puts itself in a position to review a core aspect of the
structure of the judiciary in the Member States, i.e. judicial independence.
This shift from a functional reading to a structural reading of Article 19
TEU is achieved in the name of “the rule of law”. However, there is a kind of
dissonance in the part of the judgment that says: “the very existence of
effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the
essence of the rule of law.”24 How can the mundane objective of “compliance
with EU law” be constitutive of “the essence of the rule of law”? The French
original version sounds a little better: what is at stake is le respect du droit de
l’Union.This comes closer to “le respect du droit” referred to in Article 19(1),
first subparagraph – “the observance of the law” in the English version.
Indeed, the only way to make sense of this ground-breaking judgment is to
consider that independent courts are not just the most efficient arm of EU law;
they are the main vectors of a “Union of law.”25
Interestingly, this focus on the rule of law emerges in the context of
domestic measures adopted in response to the EU programme of financial
assistance to Portugal. Among the wide range of drastic measures introduced
by the Portuguese Government was the temporary reduction in the amount of
public sector remuneration, including the judges of the Court of Auditors.
According to the ECJ, the latter measure is not precluded by EU law. But this
is on condition that it does not impair the independence of those judges. The
rule of law emerges as a sort of safety value, which could survive in a difficult
time for EU integration and for its ideal of prosperity.26 It may well be a
shorthand expression for the remnants of European supranationalism in the
context of discrediting of the ideals of the original integration project.
22. Case C-284/16, Achmea, para 36 referring to Opinion 1/09, para 68, but see already
Case C-432/05, Unibet, EU:C:2007:163.
23. Case C-72/15, Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236.
24. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para 36.
25. This expression refers back to Les Verts issued in 1986: “The European Economic
Community is a Community based on the rule of law”, or more suggestively in the French
version: “la Communauté économique européenne est une communauté de droit” (Case
C-294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para 23). This
judgment and the following cases referred to “a Union based on the rule of law/une Union de
droit”; this meant that EU law amounts to a complete and coherent system of judicial review.
26. On prosperity as European ideal, see Weiler, “Fin-de-Siècle Europe: On Ideals and
Ideology in Post-Maastricht Europe”, in Curtin and Heukels (Eds.), Institutional Dynamics of
European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers (Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp.
23–41.
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How far might the ECJ go with the notion of a freestanding Union
obligation to protect the rule of law in a context of crisis? Is this limited to the
value of justice? There is no doubt that democratic institutions are as essential
to the proper functioning of a Union based on liberal values as an independent
judiciary. We may identify a number of reasons for the current focus on justice.
First, it is admittedly about the fact that national courts are the privileged
interlocutors of the ECJ within the system of preliminary rulings. Second, it
may be speculated that the Court considers that democracy is not tantamount
to domination of the majority and requires non-majoritarian safeguards. Last
but not least, critical Union mechanisms based on mutual trust, circulation of
judgments and exchange of information, in the context of the Internal Market
and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, cannot function without
independent national judiciaries.
This is what was clearly reaffirmed in the recent Celmer case.27 The Irish
High Court, as the referring court, considered that the rule of law, and in
particular the independence of the judiciary, had been breached in Poland and,
as a consequence, that the surrender of a person on the basis of a European
arrest warrant issued by a Polish court should be refused. Now, mutual trust
between the judiciaries is traditionally considered to be a pre-condition for the
proper working of the mechanisms of judicial cooperation with the Union.
Accordingly, the ECJ states that “the existence of a real risk that the person in
respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued will, if
surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer a breach of his
fundamental right to an independent tribunal … is capable of permitting the
executing judicial authority to refrain, by way of exception, from giving effect
to that European arrest warrant.”28 The decision does not stop here, however.
An important caveat applies. Before refraining from giving effect to the
European arrest warrant, the executing judicial authority must, as a first step,
assess, on the basis of objective and reliable material, whether there is a real
lack of independence of the courts in Poland, and it must, as a second step,
assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular circumstances of
the case, there are substantive grounds for believing that the right to a fair trial
for the requested person would be breached before the judicial authorities of
the issuing Member State.
This caveat bears witness to a certain restraint on the part of the Court. Two
factors may have played a role in this respect. One of them is the consideration
that the judiciary is not a monolithic sector: as argued by the Commission, it
27. Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, EU:C:2018:586 (the national case was called Celmer).
28. Ibid., para 59.
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cannot be ruled out that some courts of that Member State are capable of
hearing a case with the required independence.29 The other factor relates
perhaps to a certain awareness of the negative impact that a definitive ruling
may have on collective feelings about the EU. An abstract and unnuanced
defence of European values may well result in people feeling threatened or
banned, excluded from the community of Europeans, a sentiment that in turn
may reinforce separatist movements in the targeted society.
Where EU law cares how (the Court thinks) people feel
There are cases where the Court’s social awareness is more transparent. Not
by chance, these cases mainly involve movements of persons. This is because
these movements are deemed to affect traditional modes of economic
organization and entrenched patterns of socialization. In Europe in particular,
free movement between Member States has come to be seen by part of the
public as threatening the national welfare systems and habitual way of life. A
strand of the Court’s recent case law reflects these public sentiments against
supposedly economically and culturally destabilizing immigration – thereby
perhaps reinforcing them. In the Dano case, the Court took seriously the risk
alleged by certain social groups of being overexposed to “a certain form of
benefit tourism.”30 This led it to “put the brakes on a liberal interpretation of
free movement rights.”31 The restrictive move has consisted of two main
interpretive changes in cases relating to access to social benefits. First, by
means of an “argumentative U-turn”,32 the Court reads EU citizenship in light
of the aim to prevent Union citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden
on the host Member State, losing sight of the – until then – privileged aim of
facilitating mobility and promoting the integration of Union citizens into the
host society. Second, abandoning its approach based on an individual
assessment of the connection between the Union citizen and the host Member
State, it adopts a more formalistic approach based on the general conditions
for access to residence status as laid down in Directive 2004/38. The Court’s
29. As reported in the Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Case C-216/18 PPU, LM,
EU:C:2018:517, para 103.
30. Opinion of A.G. Wathelet in Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:341, para 131.
31. Sarmiento and Sharpston, “European Citizenship and its New Union: Time to move
on?” in Kochenov (Ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism – The Role of Rights (Cambridge
University Press, 2017), p. 229.
32. On this “turn”, see Thym, “The elusive limits of solidarity: Residence rights of and
social benefits for economically inactive Union citizens”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 25.
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way of responding to allegedly widely shared social concerns was to stick
textually close to the EU legislature.33
In the field of immigration, the Court does not even seek to hide behind the
EU legislature; it makes clear that “the removal of any illegally staying
third-country national is a matter of priority for the Member States, in
accordance with the scheme of Directive 2008/115.”34 This bold reference
may well be informed by the notion that respecting Member States’ choices
means being responsive to the perceptions and sensibilities of a large part of
the Europeans. There is no doubt that immigration is a field where today’s
Europeans have strong feelings. These feelings largely express fears,
insecurity and distress (if surveys, polls and reports are to be believed). EU
law reflects this. Restating the conclusions of the European Council Tampere
Summit, held twenty years ago, would be impossible today. It was stated then
that the right to move freely throughout the Union “acts as a draw to many
others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for
granted. It would be in contradiction with Europe’s tradition to deny such
freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to
our territory.”35 Clearly the context has changed. The mood has shifted from
hospitality to control. In its last meeting on 28 June 2018, the European
Council concluded that it “is determined to continue and reinforce this policy
to prevent a return of the uncontrolled flows of 2015 and to further stem illegal
migration on all existing and emerging routes.”36
This is not to say that values are absent in this field. As an illustration, one
needs only think how the Court addressed the ethnicity-based argument put
forward by the Polish Government in the relocation case.37 Poland argued that
in order to meet its relocation obligations, it would “have to make far greater
efforts and bear far heavier burdens than other host Member States”, on the
grounds that Poland is “virtually ethnically homogeneous”, so its population is
“different, from a cultural and linguistic point of view, from the migrants to be
relocated on their territory.”38 The Court firmly rejected this argument, stating
that “considerations relating to the ethnic origin of applicants for international
protection cannot be taken into account since they are clearly contrary to EU
33. See further Nic Shuibhne, “Limits rising, duties ascending: The changing legal shape of
Union citizenship”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 17–50.
34. Case C-383/13 PPU, M.G & N.R., EU:C:2013:533, para 43. See annotation by De
Bruycker and Mananashvili, “Audi alteram partem in immigration detention procedures,
between the ECJ, the ECtHR and Member States: G & R”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 569–590.
35. European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Meeting on 15/16 Oct. 1999 in
Tampere, pt 3.
36. European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018, pt 2.
37. Joined Cases C-643 & 646/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the EU,
EU:C:2017:631.
38. Ibid., para 302.
Editorial comments 1337
law and, in particular, to Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union”, prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnic or
social origins.39 True, EU migration law is subject, as are all EU law fields, to
EU constitutional requirements. Yet the development of this field can hardly
be presented as flowing from “the fundamental premiss that each Member
State shares with all the other Member States, and recognizes that they share
with it, a set of common [liberal] values on which the EU is founded …”.40
Rather, it might be seen more as a series of compromises between conflicting
national ideological forces, where policy makers strain to accommodate what
they believe to be people’s views and feelings about immigration. Arguably,
the Court is not free from this tension.41
The extent to which it is difficult to ignore the perceptions and sensibilities
of the people in today’s Europe, even if they do not correspond to objective
views of the situation, is perhaps best exemplified by the changes in the
position assumed by Chancellor Merkel over the last years.42 It is noteworthy
that her decision to suspend Dublin procedures for Syrian citizens in August
2015 was largely motivated by the will to maintain the “European dream” of
allowing an area without internal borders.43 The prevailing mood in Germany
was then one of enthusiasm. Three years later, the mood has changed.44 A
renewed anxiety about immigration has emerged in the German population.
Coming under intense political pressure at home, the Chancellor agreed to
new rules on immigration, and searches for possibilities to stop or send back
migrants currently arriving in Greece and Spain.
Should EU law care about how people feel?
EU law has traditionally been conceived as a means to protect the fragile
supranational structure and order from the power relationships of high
politics, explosive social conflicts, and sensitive moral and cultural struggles.
As a result, “the everyday mass of European society” has been pushed out of
39. Ibid., para 305.
40. Opinion 2/13, ECHR, para 168.
41. On the impact of ideology on judicial reasoning, see C´apeta, “Ideology and Legal
Reasoning at the European Court of Justice”, in Perišin and Rodin (Eds.), The Transformation
or Reconstitution of Europe (Hart, 2018), pp. 89–119.
42. See more broadly Waldron, “What respect is owed to illusions about immigration and
culture?”, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-49, October 2016.
43. Spiegel Staff, “The Makings of Merkel’s Decision to Accept Refugees”, Der Spiegel
Online (24 Aug. 2016).
44. Borneman and Ghassem-Fachandi, “The concept of Stimmung. From indifference to
xenophobia in Germany’s refugee crisis”, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory (2017),
105–135.
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the EU and its law.45 The main ambition of EU lawyers was to establish the set
of rules and structural principles on which the whole construction could be
based. From this follows the notion that EU law is “a structured network of
principles, rules, and mutually interdependent legal relations.”46 This stable
and resilient structure may be helpful in times of turmoil. The EU finds refuge
in the order of principles and values enshrined in its law. However, now that
the permissive consensus about European integration has eroded, in times of
fierce political and cultural battles, it could also lead to the impression that EU
law is ideological in nature, stuck to its value choices, and not concerned with
“real” society.
This may prompt the EU and its law to reconnect with society – what it
imagines to be the concerns, sentiments and ideas of the mass of Europeans.
As Durkheim famously put it, “there can be no society which does not feel the
need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective
sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its
personality.”47 For this purpose, it is important that public sentiments are
based on objective views, on accurate information and on the true state of
affairs. This justifies the Commission’s new initiative to combat fake news in
the EU.48 However, it should be clear that deference to public beliefs and
sentiments comes with a major risk – the risk of instrumentalization: public
sentiments are easily made subservient to partisan interests by political
leaders. In that case, the willingness to stick closer to reality may well
crystallize into proposals that are contrary to EU common values or simply
unrealistic.
The latest development on the management of the migration crisis is a case
in point. At the June European Council, the EU leaders, who felt under
pressure from public opinion in their respective countries, called for a new
approach. They made two suggestions: setting up, on a voluntary basis,
“controlled centres” in Member States for migrants who disembark in the EU,
and exploring the concept of “regional disembarkation platforms” in
neighbouring countries for migrants who are rescued at sea and disembark
outside the EU. The Commission followed suit with the publication of a series
of non-papers on 24 July 2018.49 However, immediately after they were
45. See to that effect Favell, “European Union Versus European Society: Sociologists on
‘Brexit’ and the ‘Failure’ of Europeanization”, in Outhwaite (Ed.), Brexit: Sociological
Responses (Anthem Press, 2017), pp. 193–199.
46. Opinion 2/13, para 167.
47. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) (Free Press, 1965), p. 475.
48. European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: A European Approach,
COM(2018)236 final.
49. European Commission, “Managing Migration: Commission expands on
disembarkation and controlled centre concepts”, 24 July 2018.
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articulated, these ideas proved highly problematic and divisive. Can we make
sense of these structures without creating “closed” centres or detention camps,
contrary to international law and human rights?50 Can we convince Member
States and third countries to provide such structures without facing again the
problem of hotspots concentrated in unsafe countries? Whether these fairly
ambiguous ideas will ever become concrete and, if so, what these structures
might really look like, remains far from clear. In the current divided Union,
relying on common values may not be enough to give European citizens a
“common sense of justice throughout the Union”;51 but acting against the
background of perceived societal feelings might not always be desirable.
50. As illustrations of the ambiguities prevalent in this domain: some national leaders
quickly declared support for the establishment of “closed” reception centres rather than
“controlled” centres, whereas others considered that disembarkation platforms can be
understood to refer to “expulsion centres for rejected asylum seekers.”
51. Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 3 Dec.
1998, O.J. 1999, C 19/1.
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